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Manslaughter by Text: Is Encouraging Suicide Manslaughter? 
Carla Zavala* 
I. Introduction 
On the morning of July 13, 2014, police found an eighteen-year-old dead in his pick-up 
truck behind a K-Mart in Fairhaven, Massachusetts.1  It was Conrad Roy, whose mother had 
reported him missing after he failed to come home the night before.2  He left his mother’s house 
the previous night, around 6:30 PM, telling her that he would be visiting a friend.3  Instead, the 
young man drove to the Fairhaven K-Mart and filled the passenger cabin of his truck with carbon 
monoxide using a combustion engine.4  By the time the police found Conrad the next morning, he 
was dead.5  According to the district attorney’s office, police searched Conrad’s cell phone in the 
course of their investigation and found that he had been text-messaging Michelle Carter at the time 
of his death.6  
At the time of Conrad’s suicide, Michelle Carter was a seventeen-year-old high school 
student.  She met Conrad in 2012 while both were visiting relatives in the same Florida 
neighborhood.7  The two initiated a romantic relationship that was primarily carried on through 
online and cell phone communication, with very little in-person contact.8  Initially, Michelle 
                                                        
* J.D. Candidate 2017, Seton Hall University School of Law. 
1 See Commonwealth’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 17, Commonwealth v. Carter, No. 
15YO0001NE (Mass. Dist. Ct. Aug. 21, 2015). 
2 See id. 
3 See id. 
4 See id. 
5 See Stephanie Slifer, Is It a Crime to “Encourage Suicide”? Teens’ Texts Under Scrutiny, CBS NEWS, Mar. 3, 
2015, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/is-it-a-crime-to-encourage-suicide-unusual-massachusetts-case-of-conrad-roy-
and-michelle-carter/. 
6 See Investigators Say Plainville Girl ‘Strongly Influenced’ Teen’s Suicide, CBS BOS., Feb. 27, 2015, 
http://boston.cbslocal.com/2015/02/27/investigators-say-plainville-girl-strongly-influenced-teens-suicide/. 
7 See Astead W. Henderdon & John R. Ellement, Judge Won’t Dismiss Case Against Teen Who Urged Friend’s 
Suicide, BOS. GLOBE, Sept. 23, 2015, https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2015/09/23/judge-refuses-dismiss-
charge-plainville-teen-suicide/F6IlTaXG7L6X0MJTQAYuyK/story.html. 
8 See Commonwealth’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 1, at 1. 
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admitted to police that she was talking to Conrad at the time he committed suicide but claimed she 
did not know what he was doing.9  She said that when the phone call ended, she “did not think 
much of it.”10  Police were able to recover conversations between the two from Conrad’s cell 
phone, despite Michelle having asked Conrad to delete them.11  Conrad’s text messages revealed 
a very different picture.  For at least a week prior to his suicide, Conrad spoke to Michelle about 
his plans to commit suicide.12  Michelle’s own text messages with a friend revealed that she had a 
forty-seven minute telephone conversation with Conrad on the night he committed suicide.13  
On February 5, 2015, a grand jury indicted Michelle on charges of involuntary 
manslaughter for Conrad’s suicide.14  According to prosecutors, Michelle “pressured [Conrad] to 
go through with suicide for almost a week before he carried out the act . . . counseled him to 
overcome his fears; researched methods of committing suicide painlessly; and lied to police, his 
family and her friends about his whereabouts during the act itself and after.”15  The district attorney 
believed Michelle’s involvement “caused Conrad’s death by wantonly and recklessly assisting him 
in poisoning himself with carbon monoxide.”16  Bristol County Judge Bettina Borders agreed and 
rejected Michelle’s motion to dismiss on September 23, 2015, allowing the prosecution to proceed 
with the charges against her.17 
                                                        
9 See Commonwealth’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 1, at 18. 
10 Id. 
11 Abby Phillip, “It’s Now or Never”: Texts Reveal Teen’s Efforts to Pressure Boyfriend into Suicide, WASH. POST, 
Aug. 31, 2016, http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/08/31/its-now-or-never-texts-reveal-
teens-efforts-to-pressure-boyfriend-into-suicide/. 
12 See Commonwealth’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 1, at 1. 
13 See id. at 21; see also Henderdon & Ellement, supra note 7. 
14 See Commonwealth’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 1, at 1; Slifer, supra note 5. 
15 Phillip, supra note 11. 
16 Commonwealth’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 1, at 24. 
17 See Henderdon & Ellement, supra note 7. 
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Suicide is a significant problem in the United States.18  Suicide is the tenth leading cause 
of death for people of all ages in the United States.19  For Americans between ages fifteen and 
twenty-four, the reality is still harsher: suicide is the second leading cause of death in this age 
group.20  High school students seem especially vulnerable to attempting suicide.21  This means that 
it is likely that most teenagers and young adults know someone who has had suicidal thoughts or 
has attempted suicide.  What if, instead of supporting their depressed peers or encouraging them 
to seek psychiatric help, people began supporting their plans to commit suicide and pressuring 
them to kill themselves?  This could be why the public has found Michelle’s actions so appalling.   
Even a cursory glance at the comments on any news article about Michelle’s case will show 
that many people agree with the prosecution’s decision to charge Michelle.  Certainly, her actions 
were not those of a model friend, girlfriend, or citizen.  Martin W. Healy, chief legal counsel at 
the Massachusetts Bar Association, commented to the Boston Globe that Michelle’s lawyers “do 
not have a particularly sympathetic defendant.”22  But are her actions so blameworthy that she 
should spend twenty years in state prison?23  Not all actions that insult society’s conception of 
moral conduct give rise to criminal liability. 
                                                        
18 According to the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), over the past decade, suicide has increased 
from a low of 10.4 per 100,000 people in 2000 to 12.1 per 100,000 people in 2013, the most recent year for which 
data is available. See Suicide Facts, SUICIDE AWARENESS VOICES OF EDUCATION, 
http://www.save.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=home.viewPage&page_id=705D5DF4-055B-F1EC-
3F66462866FCB4E6 (last visited Mar. 19, 2016). 
19 See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. 10 Leading Causes of Death by Age Group, CENTERS FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (2013), 
http://www.cdc.gov/injury/wisqars/pdf/leading_causes_of_death_by_age_group_2013-a.pdf. 
20 See id. 
21 In 2013, eight percent of students in high school attempted suicide, compared to 0.6% of adults over eighteen 
years old. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. See Suicide Facts at a Glance, CENTERS FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL AND PREVENTION (2015), http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/suicide-datasheet-a.pdf. 
22 Henderdon & Ellement, supra note 7. 
23 In Massachusetts, manslaughter carries a maximum sentence of twenty years in state prison.  MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. ch. 265, § 13 (West 2015). 
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Part II of this Comment will discuss the particular circumstances of Conrad Roy’s suicide 
and Michelle Carter’s role in it, which gave rise to her indictment for involuntary manslaughter.  
Part III of this Comment will analyze the history of how various states have treated actions like 
Michelle’s.  Part IV will separate the types of conduct into three categories by the defendant’s 
level of participation in the other person’s suicide.  Part V will argue that a statute that specifically 
proscribes the encouragement of suicide would be better suited to achieve the societal goals 
punishment is intended to serve and would be a better alternative for prosecuting Michelle and 
others like her.  Part VI briefly concludes.  
II. The Case Against Michelle Carter 
Michelle Carter is accused of encouraging her boyfriend, Conrad Roy, to commit suicide, 
which he eventually did.  This section will address the specifics of Michelle’s involvement in 
Conrad’s suicide.  Then, it will discuss the arguments raised by the prosecution in its charges 
against Michelle.  Lastly, it will delineate the arguments raised by Michelle in her defense.  
A. Michelle Carter’s Role in Conrad Roy’s Suicide 
Michelle Carter and Conrad Roy met in 2012, when both teens were visiting relatives who 
lived in Florida.24  Afterwards, they developed a romantic relationship.  Although they both lived 
in Massachusetts, their relationship was mostly online.25  Conrad had a history of.  According to 
his family, Conrad had been struggling with suicidal thoughts and depression these issues for 
several years.26  Conrad had attempted suicide in 2012 by ingesting acetaminophen and was treated 
with medication, counseling, and hospitalizations at psychiatric facilities. 27   Conrad’s 
                                                        
24 See Henderdon & Ellement, supra note 7. 
25 See Commonwealth’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 1, at 1.  Some sources have 
reported that the two teens actually met on the internet prior to meeting in person.  See Phillip, supra note 11. 
26 See CBS BOS., supra note 6. 
27 See Laura Crimaldi, “It’s Now or Never,” Text Said to Friend Allegedly Urged to Kill Self, BOS. GLOBE, Aug. 26, 
2015, https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2015/08/25/you-have-just-tonight-
night/jTor3lbphOrwZM9KNEPOLJ/story.html. 
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grandmother, however, claimed that Conrad seemed to be “pulling out of [the depression].”28  Text 
messages between Michelle and Conrad show the couple discussed suicide often and in great detail 
over the course of their relationship.29  She told him he was strong enough to do it, and that his 
parents would understand that he had reached a point where no one could save him.30 
Over time, Michelle became even more involved in Conrad’s suicide plans.  She 
encouraged him to overcome his fear of death or failing in his suicide attempt.31  In one text 
exchange, she told him that once he committed suicide, he would finally “get to be happy in 
heaven.  No more pain.  No more bad thoughts and worries.  [He would] be free.”32  Michelle even 
conducted research and recommended methods of suicide. 33   On one occasion, Michelle 
specifically suggested that Conrad kill himself by carbon monoxide poisoning, which would be 
“painless” and “would definitely work.”34  When Conrad failed to carry out the plans, Michelle 
expressed her frustration to him: “I guess that [I am frustrated], just because you always say you 
are going to do it but you don’t, but last night I know you really wanted to do it and I’m not mad.   
Well I mean kind of, I guess.”35  Michelle complained to him that he always had an excuse for not 
committing suicide.36 
On July 6, 2014, six days before Conrad committed suicide, Conrad and Michelle discussed 
the logistics of his suicide plans.37  Michelle told him that with carbon monoxide poisoning he 
would “lose consciousness with no pain.  [He would] just fall asleep and die.”38  On July 9, Conrad 
                                                        
28 See CBS BOS., supra note 6. 
29 See Phillip, supra note 11. 
30 See Commonwealth’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 1, at 2. 
31 See id. at 3. 
32 Id. 
33 See Phillip, supra note 11. 
34 See id. 
35 Commonwealth’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 1, at 4. 
36 See id. at 4–5. 
37 See id. at 6. 
38 See id. 
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realized his father’s generator, which he was going to use to produce carbon monoxide, did not 
work.39  In the days that followed, Michelle and Conrad worked on finding another method to 
produce carbon monoxide and ensured that Conrad’s parents did not find out about the plan.40 
On July 12, 2014, Michelle and Conrad began their conversation at 4:19 AM, when 
Michelle suggested that “[i]t’s probably the best time now because everyone is sleeping.” 41 
Throughout the day, Michelle asked him if he was going to do it that night, and told him repeatedly 
that he was overthinking and needed to “just do it.”42  Conrad sent his last text message at 6:25 PM 
that evening, when he left his mother’s house for the K-Mart in Fairhaven, Massachusetts.43  
Conrad’s phone records show two forty-minute phone calls with Michelle that evening.44  During 
the second phone call, Conrad exited the car and told Michelle that he was afraid the carbon 
monoxide poisoning was working; she told him to “get back in.”45  The next morning, police found 
Conrad’s car in the parking lot, after his mother reported him missing.46  Conrad Roy was dead. 
In the days that followed, Michelle told Conrad’s mother and sister, her own friend 
Samantha, and the police that she did not know that Conrad planned to commit suicide.47  The 
police searched Michelle’s phone and noted that she had deleted her conversation with Conrad 
after 7:00 PM on the evening he committed suicide.48  When she heard that police were looking 
into Conrad’s text messages as part of his suicide investigation, Michelle texted her friend 
                                                        
39 See id. at 8. 
40 See id. at 9–10. 
41 See Commonwealth’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 1, at 11. 
42 See id. at 12–16. 
43 See id. at 16. 
44 See id. at 17. 
45 See id.  The police found this information in Michelle’s text messages to her friend Samantha Boardman on 
September 15.  See Commonwealth’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 1, at 21 (“I was the 
one on the phone with him and he got out of the car because [it] was working and he got scared and I fucken [sic] 
told him to get back in, Sam, because I knew he would do it all over again the next day and I couldn’t have him live 
the way he was living anymore.”). 
46 See Commonwealth’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 1, at 17. 
47 See id. at 17–18. 
48 See id. at 18. 
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Samantha in a panic, claiming that if police were to read her messages to Conrad, she would be 
“done,” his family would hate her, and she could go to jail.49  In September, Michelle began telling 
Samantha that Conrad’s death was her fault because she could have stopped him but that Samantha 
would not understand because she had “never helped someone with a suicide.”50 
B. District Attorney’s Case 
In February 2015, a grand jury indicted Michelle Carter, now eighteen years old, for 
involuntary manslaughter. 51   The manslaughter statute in Massachusetts does not contain a 
definition for “manslaughter;” instead, its meaning is derived from the common law definition.52  
Common law defines involuntary manslaughter as “an unlawful homicide unintentionally caused 
by an act which constitutes such a disregard of probable harmful consequences to another as to 
amount to wanton or reckless conduct.”53  According to the State, Michelle’s actions were both 
objectively and subjectively reckless.54  Michelle was objectively wanton or reckless because “any 
woman in [her] position would appreciate the danger in advocating that carbon monoxide 
poisoning is a painless and effective way of committing suicide to a suicidal teen.”55  Alternatively, 
the prosecution argues that her conduct was also subjectively wanton or reckless because under 
                                                        
49 See id. at 20. 
50 See id. at 21–22. 
51 See Michael Miller, Michelle Carter Can Face Manslaughter Charge for Allegedly Encouraging Boyfriend’s 
Suicide, Judge Rules, WASH. POST, Sept. 24, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-
mix/wp/2015/09/24/michelle-carter-can-face-manslaughter-charge-for-allegedly-encouraging-boyfriends-suicide-
judge-rules/.  
52 See Commonwealth v. Catalina, 556 N.E.2d 973, 976 (Mass. 1990); see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 
13 (West 2015). 
53 See Commonwealth v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 926 N.E.2d 206, 211 (Mass. 2010).  For purposes of 
manslaughter, “wanton” and “reckless” conduct are considered synonymous.  See e.g., id. (“Wanton or reckless 
conduct generally involves a wilful [sic] act that is undertaken in disregard of the probable harm to others that may 
result.”); Commonwealth v. Welansky, 55 N.E.2d 902, 910 (Mass. 1944) (“The words ‘wanton’ and ‘reckless’ are 
practically synonymous in this connection, although the word ‘wanton’ may contain a suggestion of arrogance or 
insolence or heartlessness that is lacking in the word ‘reckless.’ But intentional conduct to which either word applies 
is followed by the same legal consequences as though both words applied.”). 
54 A defendant can be found guilty of manslaughter if his or her conduct was either objectively or subjectively 
reckless.  See Commonwealth v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am. Inc., 926 N.E.2d 206, 211–12 (Mass. 2010); see also 
discussion at infra II.C. 
55 Commonwealth’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 1, at 27. 
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Michelle’s own admission, she knew that Conrad was susceptible to suicidal thoughts, and she had 
advance knowledge of his plan to commit suicide on July 12.56  The State alleges that Michelle 
caused Conrad’s death by enabling him to produce carbon monoxide,57 as well as by telling him to 
“get back in” when he had second thoughts.58   
Alternatively, omission or failure to act when the defendant had a duty to act can also 
constitute wanton or reckless conduct for purposes of manslaughter prosecution.59  A defendant 
has a duty to act if (1) he or she has a special relationship to the victim or (2) he or she created a 
life-threatening condition.60  The State relied on the latter theory, arguing that Carter created a life-
threatening condition for a suicidal Conrad by directing Conrad to obtain a generator and 
pressuring him to commit suicide.61  Because she created the life-threatening condition, Michelle 
had to a duty to take reasonable steps to alleviate the risk of him carrying out the plan.62  Michelle 
could have alleviated the possible harm to Conrad by either preventing his suicide or alerting his 
family of his plans, but she failed to do so.63 
 
 
C. Defendant’s Argument64 
                                                        
56 See id. at 27. 
57 See id. at 32. 
58 See id. at 30. 
59 See Commonwealth v. Welansky, 55 N.E.2d 902, 910–11 (Mass. 1995). 
60 See Commonwealth v. Zhan Tang Huang, 25 N.E.3d 315, 328 (Mass. App. Ct. 2015) (“Duty may be established 
in one of two ways.  The first is where the defendant has a special relationship to the victim. . . .  The second is 
where the defendant ‘creates a situation that poses a grave risk of death or serious injury to another.’”). 
61 See Commonwealth’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 1, at 30. 
62 See id. at 29. 
63 See id. at 29–30. 
64 This Comment will not address Defendant’s arguments that the Massachusetts Manslaughter Statute is 
unconstitutionally vague as applied to this case and that Michelle Carter is not a “youthful offender.”  See 
Defendant’s Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 17–18, 15–17, Commonwealth v. Carter, No. 
15YO0001NE (Mass. Dist. Ct. Aug. 21, 2015) (hereinafter Defendant’s Memorandum). 
Carla Zavala Comment 
 10 
In response to these allegations, Michelle argues that there is not enough evidence to 
sustain a charge of involuntary manslaughter because she was not wanton or reckless.  First, 
Michelle argues that did not commit an affirmative act that constituted wanton or reckless conduct 
because there is no evidence that “a physical act of force, pressure, violence, or any direct touching 
by the defendant whatsoever led to this manner of death.”65  For this argument, the defense cites 
Massachusetts case law that requires a “physical act” that caused the victim’s death for 
manslaughter which is not based on an omission.66  She did not provide the physical means for 
Conrad to commit suicide, and she was not physically present at the time that he committed the 
act.67 
Second, Michelle contends she cannot be charged under the alternative theory of wanton 
or reckless conduct by omission.  First, Michelle and Conrad did not have a “special relationship” 
recognized by law that would give rise to a duty to prevent Conrad from committing suicide.68  
Michelle also argued that she did not “create” the risk of death for Conrad because he had 
contemplated suicide before meeting Michelle, and therefore his suicidal condition was not caused 
by Michelle.69  Lastly, the defendant argued that her actions are protected by the First Amendment 
and the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights’s protections on free speech.70   Based on these 
arguments, the defense filed a motion to dismiss the charges against her.71  On September 23, 2015, 
                                                        
65 Defendant’s Memorandum, supra note 64, at 4. 
66 See Commonwealth v. Welansky, 55 N.E.2d 902, 909 (Mass. 1995) (“Usually wanton or reckless conduct consists 
of an affirmative act, like driving an automobile or discharging a firearm, in disregard of probable harmful 
consequences to another.”); see also Commonwealth v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 926 N.E.2d 206, 211 (Mass. 
2010) (intentional act requirement); Commonwealth v. Pugh, 969 N.E.2d 672, 687 (Mass. 2012) (physical act 
requirement). 
67 See Defendant’s Memorandum, supra note 64, at 14. 
68 See id. at 5. 
69 See id. at 9–10. 
70 See id. at 17–18 (citing State v. Melchert-Dinkel, 844 N.W.2d 13, 16 (Minn. 2014)). 
71 See Henderdon & Ellement, supra note 7. 
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Bristol County Judge Bettina Borders rejected the motion to dismiss and ruled that the case would 
proceed.72 
III. Punishing Suicide and Related Offenses 
Courts have varied in their treatment of encouraging suicide over time, with recent cases 
tending to more lenient punishment.  This section will examine the history of punishment for 
assisting suicide.  First, it will discuss the way the common law treated suicide and assisting 
suicide, both in England and the early history of the United States.  Next, it will discuss cases that 
punished suicide assistance or encouragement as murder.  Lastly, it will discuss courts’s more 
recent tendency of treating assisting or encouraging suicide as manslaughter. 
A. Common Law 
Common law treated suicide as murder and a felony.73  Under the common law of England, 
it was a “crime against the laws of God and man.”74  However, by the very nature of the crime, the 
felon was out of the reach of the law, which created a difficulty in designing a punishment.75  As 
punishment, the “goods and chattels of the criminal were forfeited to the [k]ing, his body had an 
ignominious burial in the highway, and he was deemed a murderer of himself and a felon, felo de 
se.”76  Because all of the deceased’s property was surrendered to the king, the felon’s family and 
heirs were left to suffer the consequences of the suicide. 
The colonies declined to follow the English common law by requiring forfeiture.  For 
example, the common law of Massachusetts never required forfeiture of property after suicide.77  
                                                        
72 See id. 
73 See State v. Sage, 510 N.E.2d 343, 346 (Ohio 1987). 
74 See Commonwealth v. Mink, 123 Mass. 422, 425 (1877). 
75 See id. at 423 (“It is true, undoubtedly, that suicide cannot be punished by any proceeding of the courts, for the 
reason that the person who kills himself has placed himself beyond the reach of justice, and nothing can be done.  
But the law, nevertheless, recognizes suicide as a criminal act, and the attempt at suicide is also criminal.”).  
76 Id. at 425.  In 1870, England abolished the practice of forfeiture and finally abolished suicide as a crime in 1961.  
See David S. Markson, Comment, Punishment of Suicide - A Need for Change, 14 VILL. L. REV. 463, 465 (1969). 
77 See Mink, 123 Mass. at 426. 
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Nevertheless, suicide was still considered malum in se and a felony under Massachusetts common 
law.78  An act is malum in se if it is “inherently immoral, such as murder, arson, or rape.”79  Lacking 
the ability to punish the felon, the Massachusetts legislature passed a statute in 1660 denying “the 
privilege of being buried in the common burying-place of Christians” to those who committed 
suicide and instead required that they be buried on a common highway with a cartload of stones 
over the grave.80  Massachusetts was the only state to adopt the English practice of ignominious 
burial.81  The dishonorable burial was intended to serve as a “brand of infamy, and as a warning to 
others to beware of the like damnable practices.” 82   This law remained in place into the 
establishment of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.83 
Massachusetts was not the only state to reject the harsh punishment of suicide at English 
common law.  For example, Michigan omitted suicide from its criminal law altogether.84  Some 
states included provisions in their constitutions prohibiting forfeiture of property as punishment in 
general. 85   West Virginia went a step further in 1923 and enacted a statute that specifically 
prohibited forfeiture of a person’s estate as punishment suicide.86  Faced with an inability to punish 
the crime, many states decided not to treat suicide as a crime at all when they moved away from 
                                                        
78 See id. 
79 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1103 (10th ed. 2014).  See also William L. Barnes, Jr., Revenge on Utilitarianism: 
Renouncing a Comprehensive Economic Theory of Crime and Punishment, 74 IND. L.J. 627, 648 (1999) (“‘[M]alum 
in se,’ . . . means wrong in and of itself.”). 
80 See Commonwealth v. Mink, 123 Mass. 422, 426 (1877). 
81 See Catherine D. Shaffer, Criminal Liability for Assisting Suicide, Note, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 348, 349 (1986) 
(citing  
G. Williams, THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 262 (1957)). 
82 Mink, 123 Mass. at 426. 
83 See id. 
84 See Donald Wright, Comment, Criminal Aspects of Suicide in the United States, 7 N.C. CENT. L.J. 156, 157 
(1975). 
85 See id. (citing N.C. CONST. art. 1, § 1). 
86 See W. VA. CODE § 61-11-4 (2015) (“No suicide or attainder of felony shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture 
of estate.”). 
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the common law and shifted toward statutory crimes.87  Other states retained the common law 
crime of suicide in order to allow them to punish suicide attempts.88 
It is less clear whether assisting suicide was a crime at common law.  According to some 
sources, aiding, advising, or abetting a suicide was murder, just as committing suicide was 
murder.89  The aider and abettor was treated as “a principal in the second degree to the self-murder 
of the other.”90  Other sources suggest the common law punished assisting suicide under a theory 
of accomplice liability.91  As a result, the accomplice was treated differently depending on whether 
or not he or she was present at the time of the suicide.  If the aider and abettor was present at the 
time of the act, he or she was considered a principle to the crime of suicide.92  On the other hand, 
those who encouraged suicide but were not present at the time of the suicide would escape 
punishment because conviction of an accessory required the conviction of the principal of the 
crime.93  However, this treatment was premised on the idea that suicide was a crime, to which the 
defendant could be a party, which was not always the case.94   
B. Encouraging Suicide as Murder 
Early decisions by Massachusetts courts treated assisting suicide as murder.  In the 1816 
case of Commonwealth v. Bowen, a Massachusetts court convicted the defendant for murder after 
he encouraged a fellow inmate to commit suicide.95  Bowen’s cell was adjacent to another prisoner, 
                                                        
87 See Wright, supra note 84, at 157. 
88 See id. 
89 See, e.g., State v. Sage, 510 N.E.2d 343, 346 (Ohio 1987); In re Joseph G., 667 P.2d 1176, 1179 (Cal. 1983). 
90 Id. 
91 See Wright, supra note 84, at 161. 
92 See Wright, supra note 84, at 161. 
93 See Markson, supra note 76, at 473. 
94 See Sanders v. State, 112 S.W. 68, 70 (Tex. Crim. App. 1908) (holding that the defendant could not be an 
accomplice to suicide because suicide was not a crime in the state), overruled by Aven v. State, 277 S.W. 1080 (Tex. 
Crim. App. 1925).  
95 See 13 Mass. 356 (1816).  The facts of this case are largely laid out in a later Massachusetts case, Commonwealth 
v. Mink, 123 Mass. 422, 427 (1877). 
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which allowed the men to converse freely with one another.96  Bowen was accused of encouraging 
the other prisoner to commit suicide in order to deprive the sheriff and the townspeople of the 
opportunity to see him executed. 97   The night before the other prisoner was scheduled for 
execution, he took Bowen’s advice and hung himself in his cell.98  Bowen was charged with 
murder, and the court found that “where one counseled [sic] another to commit suicide, who by 
reason of his advice, and in his presence, did so, the adviser was guilty of murder.”99 
In 1877, The Massachusetts Supreme Court revisited this application of the murder statute 
in Commonwealth v. Mink, which involved a woman who was charged with murder after 
accidentally killing her fiancé during an attempt to kill herself.100  Defendant-Mink threatened to 
kill herself when her fiancé threatened to leave her.101  He tried to prevent her from committing 
suicide, and in the ensuing struggle, she shot and killed him.102  Though the court proceeded under 
a theory of felony murder, it discussed in detail and affirmed the holding in Bowen, stating that “if 
a man murders himself, and one stands by, aiding in and abetting the death, he is as guilty as if he 
had conducted himself in the same manner where A[] murders B.  And if one becomes the 
procuring cause of death, though absent, he is accessory.”103 
This approach to suicide is not unique to Massachusetts.  In its 1872 decision, Blackburn 
v. State,104 an Ohio court heard a case where the defendant administered poison to a woman, who 
eventually died as a result.105  Evidence showed that the defendant and the decedent had agreed to 
                                                        
96 See id. 
97 See id. 
98 See id. 
99 Commonwealth v. Mink, 123 Mass. 422, 427 (1877).  
100 See 123 Mass. 422 (1877). 
101 See Mink, 123 Mass. at 422–23. 
102 See id. at 423. 
103 See id. at 428. 
104 23 Ohio St. 146 (1872), overruled on other grounds by State v. Staten, 247 N.E.2d 293 (1969). 
105 See Blackburn v. State, 23 Ohio St. 146, 147 (1872), overruled on other grounds by State v. Staten, 247 N.E.2d 
293 (1969). 
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commit suicide together.106  Evidence also showed, however, that the defendant, “by threats of 
violence or otherwise, forced [the woman] to swallow the poison, or forced it down her throat.”107  
The defendant argued that Ohio does not have a law prohibiting suicide, and therefore, he could 
“not be a criminal accessory, nor a criminal principal in the second degree, to an act which is not 
itself a crime.”108  The court found it immaterial whether the victim took the poison by choice or if 
she succumbed to pressure from the defendant.109  Instead, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that 
the defendant was not being prosecuted for assisting in suicide but for administering poison to 
another person, which is murder regardless of the other person’s wishes or condition.110  Similarly, 
in its 1920 decision, People v. Roberts, the Michigan Supreme Court held that a man committed 
murder when he mixed poison for his wife with multiple sclerosis and left it at her bedside, 
especially since her condition would not have allowed her to obtain the poison without his help.111 
However, in 1983, the Michigan Court of Appeals decided that Roberts no longer 
represented the law of Michigan.  In People v. Campbell, the court held that encouraging suicide 
and even providing the murder weapon could not be murder because murder was the unlawful 
killing of another.112  Campbell was drinking with another man who became depressed and suicidal 
during the course of their drinking together.113  Campbell encouraged the man to buy a gun, and 
when he refused, Campbell went to his house to get his own gun.114  Campbell left his gun with the 
other man, who used it to kill himself.115  Michigan’s murder statute did not include a definition 
                                                        
106 See id. at 148–49. 
107 See id. at148. 
108 Id. at 153. 
109 See id. at 162–63. 
110 See d. at163–64. 
111 See People v. Roberts, 178 N.W. 690, 693 (Mich. 1920). 
112 See 335 N.W.2d 27 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983). 
113 See People v. Campbell, 335 N.W.2d 27, 28 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983). 
114 See id. 
115 See id. at 29. 
Carla Zavala Comment 
 16 
for homicide, so the courts derived its definition from the common law, which defined a homicide 
as the killing of one human being by another.116  Since the man killed himself, there was no 
homicide to which Campbell could have been a party. 117   Furthermore, in order to find the 
defendant guilty, the court required that he want to kill the man himself, not only that he want the 
man to die.118  As a final consideration, the court noted that there had been a trend towards charging 
assistance or aiding in a suicide as manslaughter, but not murder, which the court interpreted as a 
reflection of the “moral values of the present day.”119 
C. Encouraging Suicide as Manslaughter 
Consistent with the observation of the Michigan court in Campbell, more recent cases have 
been less harsh than the courts in Bowen and Blackburn, charging those who encourage or assist 
suicide with manslaughter, instead of murder.  For example, Massachusetts backed away from its 
harsh treatment of encouraging suicide in Bowen and shifted towards treating it as manslaughter.  
Massachusetts’s statute prohibiting manslaughter does not define the term “manslaughter.” 120  
Instead, manslaughter derives its elements from its common law definition.121  The common law 
defined involuntary manslaughter as “an unlawful homicide, unintentionally caused (1) in the 
commission of an unlawful act, malum in se, [] not amounting to a felony nor likely to endanger 
life . . . or (2) by an act which constitutes such a disregard of probable harmful consequences to 
another as to constitute wanton or reckless conduct.”122  Wanton or reckless conduct is “intentional 
                                                        
116 See id. 
117 See id. at 30. 
118 See id. 
119 See Campbell, 335 N.W.2d at 30. 
120 “Whoever commits manslaughter shall, except as hereinafter provided, be punished by imprisonment in the state 
prison for not more than twenty years or by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars and imprisonment in jail or 
a house of correction for not more than two and one half years.”  MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 13 (West 
2015). 
121 See Commonwealth v. Catalina, 556 N.E.2d 973, 976 (Mass. 1990). 
122 See id.  The court in Catalina abolished the first kind of manslaughter, a death that occurs during an act that is 
malum in se but not a felony.  See id. at 977–78. 
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conduct, by way either of commission or of omission where there is a duty to act, which conduct 
involves a high degree of likelihood that substantial harm will result to another.”123  Therefore, 
conviction for involuntary manslaughter requires finding that (1) the defendant intended to commit 
an act, (2) the act the defendant intended to commit was wanton or reckless, and (3) the act caused 
the victim’s death.124   
Conduct satisfies the wanton or reckless requirement if it is either objectively or 
subjectively wanton or reckless.125  Conduct is objectively wanton or reckless “if an ordinary 
normal [person] under the same circumstances would have realized the gravity of the danger.”126  
For a finding of subjective wanton or recklessness, the “grave danger to others must have been 
apparent and the defendant must have chosen to run the risk rather than alter [his or her] conduct 
so as to avoid the act or omission [that] caused the harm.”127  Lastly, the intentional, wanton or 
reckless conduct must be the cause of the death that occurs.  Courts have defined “cause” as 
conduct which “in the natural and continuous sequence, produces the death, and without which the 
death would not have occurred.”128 
A typical manslaughter case is based on affirmative conduct that causes the death of a 
victim.  Two separate Massachusetts cases are instructive here.  In Commonwealth v. McCauley, 
the defendant was charged with involuntary manslaughter after he shot and killed one of his 
friends.129  The court found that the evidence that McCauley was not familiar with guns, had no 
intent to kill the victim, and did not know the gun was loaded was sufficient to warrant a jury 
                                                        
123 See Commonwealth v. Welansky, 55 N.E.2d 902, 910 (Mass. 1994). 
124 See Commonwealth v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am. Inc., 926 N.E.2d 206, 211–12 (Mass. 2010). 
125 See Commonwealth v. Pugh, 969 N.E.2d 672, 685 (Mass. 2012) (“Wanton or reckless conduct is determined 
based either on the defendant's specific knowledge or on what a reasonable person should have known in the 
circumstances.”). 
126 See id. (citing Welansky, 55 N.E.2d at 902). 
127 See id. 
128 See Commonwealth v. Rhoades, 401 N.E.2d 342, 351 (Mass. 1980); see also discussion infra Part IV. 
129 See Commonwealth v. McCauley, 246 N.E.2d 425, 426 (Mass. 1969). 
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instruction for manslaughter. 130   In Commonwealth v. Power-Koch, a more recent case, the 
Massachusetts Court of Appeals charged the defendant with involuntary manslaughter for shooting 
his friend in the chest.131  Like in McCauley, the court found the evidence that the defendant “did 
not know whether the gun was fully loaded” and his testimony that he had never fired the gun 
before sufficient to support a charge of involuntary manslaughter.132 
Encouraging suicide does not fit as neatly into the definition of manslaughter because there 
is usually an intervening act by the victim, which causes death.  Still, the Massachusetts Supreme 
Court has previously upheld a charge of involuntary manslaughter to an alleged assisted suicide.133  
In Persampieri v. Commonwealth, the defendant was charged with involuntary manslaughter after 
his wife committed suicide.134  Persampieri had allegedly loaded the gun for his wife at her request 
and made suggestions that would make it easier for her to discharge the gun.135  He also taunted 
her for being “too chicken” to kill herself, as she had attempted suicide twice before, but failed 
both times.136  The court held that involuntary manslaughter was an appropriate charge because the 
defendant aided his wife’s self-murder by being present in the room during the suicide, 
encouraging his wife to kill herself, and taunting her with accusations of being too scared to do 
it.137   
Courts in other states have similarly held that a defendant is guilty of manslaughter if he 
or she provides the physical means of suicide while encouraging the victim to carry out a suicide 
plan.  The Iowa Supreme Court took this approach in State v. Marti.138  In this 1980 case, the court 
                                                        
130 Id. at 429. 
131 See Commonwealth v. Power-Koch, 871 N.E.2d 1085, 1087 (Mass. App. 2007). 
132 See id. at 1089. 
133 See 175 N.E.2d 387 (Mass. 1961). 
134 See Persampieri v. Commonwealth, 175 N.E.2d 387, 389 (Mass. 1961). 
135 See id. 
136 See id. 
137 See id. at 390. 
138 See generally 290 N.W.2d 570 (Iowa 1980). 
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held that loading a gun for a suicidal person and encouraging him or her to commit suicide is 
criminal because “it constitutes murder or manslaughter, not because it coincidentally helped 
someone to die who wanted to die anyway.”139  In 1992, an appellate court in New York affirmed 
a manslaughter conviction where the defendant goaded the victim to kill himself, knowing that the 
victim was drunk and depressed.140  According to the court, the defendant acted recklessly because 
he knew there was a substantial risk that the victim would heed his advice and kill himself, due to 
his depression and intoxication.141 
IV. Categories of Encouraging Suicide 
Part of the reason that punishing actions like Michelle’s and other similar cases is so 
difficult is the lack of clear, legally significant categories of offenses.  Cases involving assisting 
or encouraging suicide fall mainly into three broad categories, with varying degrees of 
involvement on behalf of both the defendant and the victim.  Each category is defined by the causal 
connection between the defendant’s conduct and the other person’s suicide, which is also known 
as the “causation” element of the offense.142  A defendant’s act satisfies the causation element of a 
criminal offense if it is both the actual cause and the proximate cause of the prohibited result.143  In 
this case, the prohibited result is the suicide of the other person.  First, the defendant’s act is the 
actual cause of a suicide if it is a cause without which the result, in this case the suicide, would not 
have occurred when it did.144  Second, the defendant’s act is the proximate cause of the suicide if 
                                                        
139 See Marti, 290 N.W.2d at 581. 
140 See People v. Duffy, 586 N.Y.S.2d 150, 151 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992). 
141 See id.  
142 See Michael S. Moore, Causation, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME & JUSTICE 151 (Joshua Dressler ed., 2d ed. 
2002); see also Joshua Dressler, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 182–83 (6th ed. 2012). 
143 See id. at 184.  
144 See generally H.L.A. Hart & Tony Honoré, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 391–92 (2d ed. 1985); see also Dressler, 
supra note 142, at 184. 
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it produced the death in a natural and continuous sequence of events.145  This section will divide 
the cases into three categories based on whether the defendant’s actions satisfied these types of 
causation for the suicide of another person.  
A. Defendant Kills Victim Who Wanted to Die 
The first category of cases involves those defendants who physically kill the victim.  
Typically, the defendant will be charged with murder, regardless of the fact that the victim might 
have wanted to die anyway.  In this category, the defendant is both the proximate cause and the 
but-for cause of the other person’s death.  In People v. Matlock,146 the defendant claimed that the 
man he had robbed and murdered had requested that he do so.  According to Matlock, the victim 
wanted to die so that his family could collect his life insurance policy, but the policy did not cover 
suicide, so he enlisted the defendant’s help.147  In evaluating the defendant’s appeal, the court noted 
that the defendant had clearly committed murder, regardless of whether his allegations about the 
victim’s wishes were true.148  In a similar 1981 case, the Supreme Court of Kansas held that murder 
was an appropriate charge where the defendant had administered a lethal dose of cocaine at the 
victim’s request and later shot the victim in the head when the cocaine failed to bring about the 
victim’s death.149 
These cases fall easily into the category of murder or voluntary manslaughter, even if they 
are not typical murders.  Although the victim allegedly wanted to die, their death was still at the 
hands of the defendants.  In both of these cases, the defendants, not the victims, were the physical 
actors.  This fact pattern is in-line with both the legal and the layperson’s concepts of murder.  
                                                        
145 See e.g., Commonwealth v. Baker, 856 N.E.2d 908, 911 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006); Commonwealth v. Rhoades, 401 
N.E.2d 342, 351 (Mass. 1980).  
146 336 P.2d 505 (Cal. 1959). 
147 See id. at 509. 
148 See id. at 513 (finding that evidence tending to corroborate the defendant’s story went solely to the question of 
the degree of the murder).  
149 See State v. Cobb, 625 P.2d 1133, 1136 (Kan. 1981). 
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Even Mink can be put in this category, because, there, the defendant killed her fiancé by 
accidentally shooting him; the fact that the fatal shooting happened during her own suicide attempt 
is an irrelevant circumstance.150  These cases fall easily into existing categories of murder or 
manslaughter. 
B. Defendant Provides Instrument Used in Suicide 
Another category of cases involves defendants who provide a suicidal individual with the 
weapon or means to commit suicide, with knowledge that the person wanted to commit suicide.  
In this category, the defendant is the actual cause—but not the proximate cause—of the person’s 
suicide.  The defendant gives the individual the means to commit suicide, but the other person’s 
act produces the suicide.  If the act of the other was free, deliberate, and informed, the intervening 
act is a superseding cause of the suicide.151  Cases that fall in this category include providing a 
suicidal individual with a gun;152 loading the gun for a suicidal individual;153 and providing poison 
to someone who is suicidal.154  Cases like these have received more varied treatment from courts, 
ranging from murder convictions155 to findings of no liability at all.156   
Courts struggle with these cases because the “victim” commits the act that directly causes 
his or her own death, like taking the poison or shooting themselves with the loaded gun. 157  
                                                        
150 See Commonwealth v. Mink, 123 Mass. 422, 427 (1877). 
151 See Hart & Honoré, supra note 144, at 326 (“The free, deliberate, and informed intervention of a second person, 
who intends to exploit the situation created by the first, but is not acting in concert with him, is normally held to 
relieve the first actor of criminal responsibility.”). 
152 See People v. Campbell, 335 N.W.2d 27, 29 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983). 
153 See, e.g., State v. Marti, 290 N.W.2d 570, 580 (Iowa 1980); Persampieri v. Commonwealth, 175 N.E.2d 387, 389 
(Mass. 1961). 
154 See People v. Roberts, 178 N.W. 690, 693 (Mich. 1920). 
155 See Blackburn v. State, 23 Ohio St. 146, 163–64 (1872), overruled on other grounds by State v. Staten, 247 
N.E.2d 293 (1969). 
156 See Campbell, 335 N.W.2d 27, 29 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983). 
157 Compare Roberts, 178 N.W. at 693 (“[W]hen defendant mixed the paris green with water and placed it within 
reach of his wife to enable her to put an end to her suffering by putting an end to her life, he was guilty of murder by 
means of poison within the meaning of the statute, even though she requested him to do so.”) with People v. 
Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714, 716 (Mich. 1994) (“Where a defendant merely is involved in the events leading up to 
the death, such as providing the means, the proper charge is assisting in a suicide [not murder].”). 
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However, the defendant provided the instrument used for the murder, and in some cases, the victim 
would not have been able to obtain the instrument without the defendant’s action. 158   The 
defendant’s acts are blameworthy, but would not have led to a death without the victim’s 
intervening action.  
C. Defendant Verbally Encourages Suicide 
A third category of cases involves defendants who do not commit physical actions that lead 
to the victim’s death.  Instead, the defendants verbally encourage the victim to commit suicide.  
Arguably, the defendants in this category of cases are neither the actual cause nor the proximate 
cause of the suicide.  Not only does the other person’s free, deliberate, and informed act of 
committing suicide break the causal connection,159 but also, the defendant’s act was not an actual 
cause of the suicide.  The defendant neither kills the other person nor provides the means for 
suicide.  The defendant is not even physically with the other individual when he or she commits 
suicide.160  The victim could have committed suicide without the defendant’s intervention. 
In State v. Melchert-Dinkel, the defendant did not commit a physical act to help another 
person commit suicide. 161  Melchert-Dinkel posed as a suicidal nurse on message boards that 
provided emotional support for people who were also suicidal.162  Two of the people with whom 
Melchert-Dinkel had contact eventually committed suicide.163  The individuals who committed 
                                                        
158 See, e.g., Persampieri, 175 N.E.2d at 389 (victim unable to load gun herself); Campbell, 335 N.W.2d at 28 
(victim did not have his own gun); Roberts, 178 N.W. at 191 (victim’s multiple sclerosis made her helpless). 
159 See Hart & Honoré, supra note 144, at 326. 
160 At common law, an individual was held liable for the suicide of another if they were physically present when the 
other person committed suicide.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bowen, 13 Mass. 356 (1816); see also discussion 
supra Part III.A. 
161 See 844 N.W.2d 13 (Minn. 2014). 
162 See State v. Melchert-Dinkel, 844 N.W.2d 13, 16 (Minn. 2014).   
163 See id. at 17–18.  Michigan charged Melchert-Dinkel with violating a statute that criminalized the encouragement 
and assistance of suicide.  See id. at 16.  He challenged the constitutionality of the statute, and the court held it to be 
invalid as applied to speech encouraging suicide, but upheld it as applied to assistance of suicide, which the court 
defined as “help, which in turn is defined as to provide (a person etc.) with what is needed for a purpose.”  See id. at 
20–24.   
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suicide lived in England and Canada, while Melchert-Dinkel was in Minnesota.164  Similarly, 
Michelle was thirty miles away when Conrad committed suicide.165  She did not physically plug 
the power into the generator that caused his death; she did not provide him with the generator.  She 
was at her home, talking to Conrad from a remote location.166  
Because these defendants were not the actual nor proximate causes, their cases are much 
more difficult to fit into traditional concepts of murder or manslaughter.  Nevertheless, the 
defendants did contribute, if slightly, to the suicide.  Even Michelle knew that she could potentially 
face consequences for her encouragement, though she likely could not imagine she would face 
charges of manslaughter.167  In some ways, this kind of encouragement seems more culpable than 
someone who physically helps a terminally-ill loved one commit suicide, although the latter would 
fall into the category of providing physical means for suicide.168  Even so, defendants who verbally 
encourage another’s suicide are distinguishable from usual murder cases or accidental shootings, 
which are more typical manslaughters. 
V.  A Statutory Solution  
Instead of punishing encouragement169 or physical assistance of suicide under a theory of 
murder or manslaughter, states could proscribe this conduct with a statute that would specifically 
prohibit the assistance of suicide.  This section will recommend a statute under which 
encouragement and assistance to suicide can be prosecuted without resorting to manslaughter or 
                                                        
164 See Melchert-Dinkel, 844 N.W.2d at 16. 
165 See Slifer, supra note 5. 
166 See Defendant’s Memorandum, supra note 64, at 12. 
167 See Commonwealth’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 1, at 21 (“…I didn’t bully him or 
anything? So you don’t think they’ll really tell his family?”). 
168 See e.g., People v. Roberts, 178 N.W. 690, 694 (Mich. 1920) (defendant provided his wife with poison to relieve 
her of the pain caused by multiple sclerosis).  This Comment will not discuss the specific circumstance of physician-
assisted suicide, as that specific circumstance raises very different issues and require different safeguards and 
treatment in law. 
169 For purposes of this discussion, “encouragement” is defined as verbal incitement, as distinguished from 
providing material assistance, which is used to denote physical participation in the suicide (i.e. providing a gun). 
Carla Zavala Comment 
 24 
murder statutes.  Then, it will compare how prosecution under the proposed theory compares to 
the current approach in achieving the societal goals that punishment is supposed to serve. 
A. The Statute 
In People v. Campbell, when deciding a charge of murder for assisting suicide, the 
Michigan Supreme Court noted that the decision of whether to criminalize incitement to suicide 
belongs to the legislature.170  The Model Penal Code treats “causing” a suicide as criminal homicide 
“only if [the defendant] purposely causes such suicide by force, duress or deception.”171  A separate 
provision makes it a crime to “aid or solicit” suicide.172  An example of “causing” suicide would 
be a defendant who brutally beats a victim, threatening that if she does not jump out of an eleventh 
floor window to her death, he will personally beat her to death.173  Though the defendant did not 
physically throw the victim out of the window, the victim committed suicide under duress.  This 
kind of duress or coercion is different from a case where a defendant provides a gun or verbal 
encouragement to an individual who was already suicidal before the defendant intervened. 
Verbal encouragement and physical assistance would fall into the category of “aiding or 
soliciting” suicide, which is a second degree felony and an offense separate from homicide, under 
the Model Penal Code’s formulation.174  The maximum sentence for second degree felonies in the 
Model Penal Code’s tentative sentencing guidelines is twenty years imprisonment, which was 
increased from ten years imprisonment in the original draft.175  Some states have enacted specific 
                                                        
170 See 335 N.W.2d 27, 31 (Mich. App. 1983).  Other courts have also taken a similar position, finding no liability 
for assisting or aiding suicide in the absence of a specific statute prohibiting the act.  See, e.g., Grace v. State, 69 
S.W. 529, 530 (Tex. Crim. App. 1902). 
171 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.5(1) (1985). 
172 See § 210.5(2). 
173 See State v. Lassiter, 484 A.2d 13, 15–17 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984) (charged with murder). 
174 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.5(2) (1985) (“Aiding or Soliciting Suicide as an Independent Offense.  A person 
who purposely aids or solicits another to commit suicide is guilty of a felony of the second degree if his conduct 
causes such suicide or an attempted suicide, and otherwise of a misdemeanor.”). 
175 See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.06 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2011). 
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statutes that criminalize assisting or aiding suicide, but punish the offense at or about the same 
level as manslaughter.176  A specific statute should include provisions for lesser punishment, to 
accommodate the diminished culpability of the defendant, in light of the victim’s own intervening 
acts that caused his or her death.   
A specific statute should also provide a definition for what kind of assistance would rise to 
the level of “aid” to a suicide.  One suggestion would be to expand the Model Penal Code provision 
to distinguish between the different types of assistance.  Thus, under such a statute, a defendant is 
guilty of assistance to suicide if he or she: (1) “intentionally provides the means by which suicide 
is attempted or committed” or (2) intentionally acts as a suicide participant.177  A suicide participant 
is a person, other than the victim, who “actively, affirmatively participates in the act of suicide.”178  
In other words, liability for assisting suicide would be limited to those who are both the actual and 
proximate cause of the victim’s suicide.  Alternatively, the state could choose to limit liability to 
those who physically participate in the suicide. 179   If a state legislature wants the statute’s 
prohibition to reach conduct that is merely verbal encouragement, they can include a prohibition 
for causing or soliciting a suicide by means of duress.  If the victim acted under duress, their 
intervening act would not be the kind of free, deliberate, and informed act that breaks the causal 
                                                        
176 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.120 (2015) (manslaughter); CAL. PENAL CODE § 401 (West 2016) (felony); FLA. 
STAT. § 782.08 (2015) (manslaughter, second degree felony).  But compare N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.30 (McKinney 
2015) (promoting a suicide attempt is a class E felony with a maximum prison sentence of four years), with N.Y. 
PENAL LAW § 125.15 (McKinney 2015) (second degree manslaughter is a class C felony with a maximum sentence 
of fifteen years). 
177 See Shaffer, supra note 81, at 372. 
178 Id. 
179 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 26-5-5 (2015) (statute criminalizing assistance to suicide defines “assistance” as “the 
act of physically helping or physically providing the means”).  After the Michigan courts struggled to apply 
manslaughter and murder theories in cases like Roberts and Campbell, the Michigan legislature enacted a statute that 
prohibits providing the physical means for suicide or participating in the physical act of suicide if the defendant 
knew that the victim intended to commit suicide.  See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 752.1027 (2016). 
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chain between the defendant’s act and the ensuing suicide.  The fact-finder at trial would then 
determine whether the defendant’s actions rose to the level of duress. 
B. Evaluating the Alternatives 
Society punishes criminals in order to achieve certain goals.  Criminal punishment seeks 
to attain four goals: deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation, and retribution. 180  An adequate 
criminal punishment should achieve one or more of these goals.181  This section will discuss each 
goal of punishment.  Then, it will analyze and compare how each alternative for punishing 
encouraging suicide, manslaughter and a specific statute, achieves the goal of punishment.  
i. Deterrence  
One goal of criminal punishment is deterrence.  There are two kinds of deterrence: specific 
deterrence and general deterrence.  According to the theory of specific deterrence, criminal 
punishment aims to deter the criminal himself (rather than to deter others) from committing further 
crimes, by giving him an unpleasant experience he will not want to endure again.182  This theory 
of punishment requires the deterrence of the particular defendant.  Under this view, Michelle Carter 
should be prosecuted so that she will not commit this crime again.  However, there is no evidence 
that Michelle made Conrad suicidal or sought him out for that reason.  To the contrary, Conrad 
was suicidal and was treated for depression and mental illness before he even met Michelle.183  
There is also evidence that Michelle regretted not doing more to prevent Conrad from killing 
                                                        
180 See, e.g., Ashley Paige Dugger, Victim Impact Evidence in Capital Sentencing: A History of Incompatibility, 23 
AM. J. CRIM. L. 375, 398–403 (1996); Gregory G. Jackson, Punishments for Reckless Skiing–Is the Law Too 
Extreme?, 106 DICK. L. REV. 619, 634–39 (2002). See also 1 Subst. Crim. L. § 1.5 (2d ed.). 
181 According to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, a court imposing a criminal sentence shall consider the need for 
the sentence imposed to (1) “reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just 
punishment for the offense” (retributivism); (2) “afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct” (deterrence); (3) 
“to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant” (restraint); and (4) “provide the defendant with needed 
educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner” 
(rehabilitiation).  See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2012). 
182 See 1 Subst. Crim. L. § 1.5 (2d ed.). 
183 See Phillip, supra note 11. 
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himself.184  A statutory prohibition would allow for Michelle to be punished, while allowing more 
lenient penalties that would better fit the crime she committed.  Restraint185 and rehabilitation,186 
discussed further below, are often considered types of specific deterrence.187 
General deterrence argues for the punishment of offenders as a way of sending a message 
to other people who might consider engaging in the same conduct in the future.  According to this 
theory, other people will see the harsh punishment imposed upon the offender and will not want 
to suffer the same fate, so they will not engage in the behavior.188  In the case of encouraging or 
aiding suicide, criminal prosecution seeks to deter people from encouraging another’s suicide to 
advance their own personal motives, like pursuing an inheritance or ridding themselves of a 
burdensome dependent.189  
There is evidence that general deterrence is mildly effective for malum prohibitum 190 
offenses, but not for other kinds of crime.191  Three requirements must be met in order for this kind 
of deterrence to be effective.192  First, the potential offender must know of the law prohibiting the 
conduct.193  Second, the offender must perceive the cost of violating the law as greater than any 
benefit he or she will derive from committing the crime.194  Lastly, the potential offender must be 
able and willing to allow this knowledge to influence his or her actions.195  Under this analysis, it 
                                                        
184 See Defendant’s Memorandum, supra note 64, at 20. 
185 See infra Part IV.B.ii. 
186 See infra Part IV.B.iii. 
187 See e.g., Barnes, supra note 79, at 633. 
188 See id. at 631. 
189 See Wright supra note 84, at 162. 
190 An offense is categorized as malum prohibitum if it is wrong only because it is proscribed by law, as opposed to 
malum in se offenses, which are inherently wrong.  See Barnes, supra note 79, at 646. 
191 See J. ANDENAES, PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE 45–46 (1974). 
192 See generally Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the Formulation of Criminal Law 
Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its Best, 91 GEO. L.J. 949 (2003) (arguing that criminal punishment does very little 
to deter potential offenders).  
193 See id. at 954. 
194 See id. 
195 See id. at 954–56. 
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is unlikely that charging Michelle with manslaughter will deter others from engaging in the same 
behavior.   
First, the public is probably unaware that some jurisdictions punish encouraging suicide, 
in any form, as murder or manslaughter.  Michelle’s case has been widely reported and has brought 
attention to the possibility of being charged with involuntary manslaughter for encouraging 
suicide.  Prior to her case, however, the average person was likely unaware that verbal 
encouragement—or even incitement—of suicide could be manslaughter.  As time passes and 
Michelle’s case fades from the public eye, the general population will again forget, and any 
potential deterrent effect will be lost.  A specific statute that proscribes certain kinds of 
encouragement and assistance of suicide would leave no doubt in the mind of both law 
enforcement and citizens that such acts are prohibited.  A clear, straightforward prohibition on 
encouragement or assistance to suicide would at least increase the likelihood that a potential 
offender can understand the law.196 
Second, effective general deterrence requires the offender to perceive the cost of 
punishment to be greater than any benefit from the violation. Even those who are aware of the 
possibility of being charged with manslaughter for encouraging another’s suicide might still 
believe that they are unlikely to be caught or prosecuted.  This will influence their balancing of the 
costs and benefits of committing the prohibited act.  For example, Michelle asked Conrad to delete 
their text message conversations before committing suicide so that she would not be associated 
with his death.197  Furthermore, prosecution for encouraging suicide is sporadic and often leads to 
                                                        
196 See id. at 989 (“[T]here are ways in which knowledge of [a criminal law rule] can be increased. . . .  [A] bare 
prohibition itself is the easiest rule to convey.”). 
197 See Phillip, supra note 11. 
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wildly inconsistent outcomes.198  This is certainly true in Michelle’s case; the last reported case of 
a charge of manslaughter for encouraging suicide in Massachusetts was Persampieri v. 
Commonwealth in 1961.199  Delay between the commission of the act and the eventual punishment 
may also distort any cost-benefit analysis a potential offender might undertake, making benefits 
seem much greater than any costs which he or she believes to be far off.200  Michelle’s case has 
been significantly delayed by motions and arguments about whether or not her actions fit the 
definition of involuntary manslaughter under Massachusetts precedent.201  If Massachusetts passed 
the proposed statute that specifically prohibited encouraging suicide, such issues would be easier 
to decide because the statute would define the offense.  As jurisprudence develops, appellate courts 
would resolve ambiguities that remain in the application of the statute. 
The final prerequisite for deterrence to be effective requires that the offender use the 
calculation of costs against benefits to influence his or her decisions.  It is likely that offenders do 
not consider the legal implications of their acts at all.  For example, use of drugs and alcohol often 
impairs an offender’s judgment.202  Critics of the theory of both general and specific deterrence 
argue that the idea of a criminal rational actor is an oxymoron.203  This is especially true in 
                                                        
198 See Shaffer, supra note 81, at 370–71 (arguing that police and prosecutorial discretion tends to make prosecution 
of encouraging suicide ineffective and results in injustice whenever charges are pursued).   
199 See Persampieri v. Commonwealth, 175 N.E.2d 387, 389 (Mass. 1961).  Some sources reported that Bristol 
County District Attorney Thomas Quinn had a relationship with Conrad’s family, and he eventually recused himself 
from the case.  CBS BOS., supra note 6.  It is not clear whether his relationship influenced the decision to bring 
charges against Michelle. 
200 See Robinson & Darley, supra note 192, at 954. 
201 Conrad committed suicide in July 2014, and the Judge decided the Defendant’s motion to dismiss in September 
2015.  See Miller, supra note 51. 
202 See Robinson & Darley, supra note 192, at 954–56. 
203 See Barnes, supra note 79, at 631;  see also James Q. Wilson, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 118 (rev. ed. 1983) 
(“[S]ome scholars contend that a large fraction of crime is committed by persons who are so impulsive, irrational, or 
abnormal that even if there were no delay, uncertainty, or ignorance attached to the consequences of criminality, we 
would still have a lot of crime.”). 
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situations rife with emotion like those involving suicide.204  Michelle probably did not consider the 
costs or possible consequences of her encouragement in the weeks leading up to Conrad’s suicide.  
It was not until afterwards that she seemed to consider that she could be prosecuted for her 
involvement.205   
ii. Restraint 
Restraint, also called incapacitation, is a theory of punishment focused on removing the 
criminal from society.206  According to this theory, if a defendant is imprisoned or restrained in 
some way, then he or she cannot commit more crimes and possibly do more harm to society.207  
The only way to incapacitate an offender completely is to put them to death, since that will 
permanently remove them from society.208  Any other form of incapacitation is by definition less 
than complete.  Therefore, unless the state sentenced all offenders to death or life in prison, how 
well punishment achieves incapacitation is a matter of degree.  Even offenders serving life in 
prison without possibility of parole remain members of prison society and, in some cases, can 
continue their life of crime within the prison.209  Restraint can, however, be furthered through other 
means. When offenders are put in prison, they are isolated from general society for some period 
of time, protecting at least some part of the population from their crimes.  Electronic monitoring 
systems provide an alternative to incarceration while still restraining the offender to some degree. 
                                                        
204 See generally Herbert Hendin, Suicide and the Request for Assisted Suicide Meaning and Motivation, 35 DUQ. L. 
REV. 285, 287–299 (1996) (identifying depression, ambivalence, and psychodynamics as factors that influence an 
individual’s decision to commit suicide or request physician assisted suicide). 
205 Michelle requested that Conrad delete her text messages from his phone on the night he committed suicide, and 
deleted them from her own phone as well.  Commonwealth’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra 
note 1, at 18.  This is the first indication that Michelle was aware that her actions could be wrong.  She later sent text 
messages to her friend Samantha expressing her fear that she might be prosecuted.  See id. at 20. 
206 See Jackson, supra note 180, at 637. 
207 See Dugger, supra note 180, at 401. 
208 See id. at 402. 
209 See id. at 402 (“[A] life sentence (most generally, life without the possibility of parole) also keeps [offenders] 
away from us.  It just keeps them alive and away from us, in their own society, rather than dead and away from 
us.”).  See also Barnes, supra note 79, at 632 (“Is a murderer really incapacitated if he murders other prisoners while 
behind bars?”). 
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210  In the case of punishing suicide encouragement, prosecution for manslaughter would carry a 
longer prison term than a specific statute that would impose a lighter sentence.  Therefore, if 
removing Michelle from the general public were the ultimate goal, a charge of manslaughter would 
better achieve it. 
There is, however, no reason to believe that time in prison would protect other suicidal 
individuals in society.  In fact, research indicates that in these situations, the person who commits 
suicide manipulates others into assisting or encouraging their suicide.211  According to this theory, 
suicidal individuals often respond to stress with “helplessness, clinging, asking to be told what to 
do, and wanting to be looked after, and a suicide attempt may be an effort to coerce such 
support.”212  Even trained therapists can fall victim to this coercion, so it is not surprising that those 
close to the individual find themselves drawn into a loved one’s plan for suicide.213  If this is true, 
then restraining the person who assisted or encouraged the suicide will not actually protect other 
suicidal individuals, who might manipulate another loved one to encourage or help plan their 
suicide.214  This dynamic makes encouraging suicide a unique situation in which incapacitation of 
the offender does not actually protect those who are at risk of becoming victims of the offense.  
Neither the statutory solution nor the current approach under a theory of manslaughter truly serves 
the goal of restraining the offender to prevent them from hurting society.  Because incapacitation 
for any length of time does not protect society, the offender should only be restrained long enough 
                                                        
210 Massachussets utilizes an electronic monitoring program as an alternative to incarceration and to provide an extra 
level of supervision of probationers and parolees.  See generally The Electronic Monitoring Program Fact Sheet 
2014, MASS. PROBATION SERVICE 1, http:// www.mass.gov/courts/probation/elmofactsheet.pdf (last visited Apr. 9, 
2016). 
211 See Shaffer, supra note 81, at 355 (“Suicidal persons often have ‘learned to use the anxiety that they can arouse 
in others about their death in a coercive or manipulative way.’”).  See also Hendin, supra note 204, at 293 (noting 
that both terminally ill patients who ask to die and people who are otherwise suicidal are often motivated by a desire 
to test the affection of others). 
212 Shaffer, supra note 81, at 355 (internal citations omitted). 
213 See id. at 355–56.  
214 See Shaffer, supra note 81, at 355. 
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to serve the other goals of punishment; longer prison terms would not serve the goal of 
incapacitation—protecting society—any more than a short prison term.  
iii. Rehabilitation 
Rehabilitation is a theory of punishment that argues for providing offenders the appropriate 
treatment in order to reintegrate the offender into society as law-abiding citizens.215  Unlike the 
other goals of punishment, rehabilitation seeks to help the offender as well as society.  The offender 
benefits by being purged of their “moral sickness” and reaccepted into society, and society benefits 
from another productive member.216  According to one definition of rehabilitation, the prosecution 
and punishment itself is rehabilitative because it gives the offender more perfect information on 
the chances of being caught committing the offense.217  A more contemporary understanding of 
rehabilitation argues that punishment should help the offender reintegrate into society by 
reforming the offender’s character or by medical treatment.218   
The punishment of encouraging suicide, whether by specific statute or otherwise, will 
achieve the first kind of rehabilitation by providing the offender with more perfect information for 
forming future decisions.  For example, Michelle will likely think twice before encouraging 
another person to carry out a plan to commit suicide, regardless of whether she was charged with 
manslaughter or under a specific statute prohibiting encouragement.219  However, a longer prison 
                                                        
215 See Dugger, supra note 180, at 402 (citing James M. Burns & Joseph S. Mattina, SENTENCING 1-5 (1978)).  
Some have criticized this theory because the definition of rehabilitation varies, which results in different kinds of 
“treatment” in different situations; see also Meghan J. Ryan, Death and Rehabilitation, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
1231, 1261–68 (2013) (arguing that most discussions of rehabilitation as a goal of punishment are imprecise because 
the concept of rehabilitation is actually made up of various components). 
216 See Markus Dirk Dubber, The Right to Be Punished: Autonomy and Its Demise in Moral Penal Thought, 16 LAW 
& HIST. REV. 113, 143 (1993); see also Ryan, supra note 215, at 1264–67. 
217 See Barnes, supra note 79, at 634. 
218 See Ryan, supra note 215 at 1264–65; see also Meghan Ryan, Science and the New Rehabilitation, 3 VA. J. 
CRIM. L. 261, 327–28 (2015) [hereinafter Science] (“Today, commentators on rehabilitation often focus almost 
exclusively on offenders' behaviors and reintegration into society.”). 
219 Some scholars have criticized this assumption, arguing that it fails to take account of recidivism rates among 
offenders.  See Barnes, supra note 79, at 634; Ryan, supra note 215, at 1267 (“[A]ny potential benefits of 
reintegrating rehabilitated offenders back into society also hinge on the offenders not re-offending.”).  However, 
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sentence is not likely to result in the second kind of rehabilitation: helping the offender reintegrate 
into society.  To the contrary, the American prison system has largely failed to achieve reformation 
of prisoners.220  Incarceration itself has been found to have negative psychological effects on prison 
inmates. 221   A long prison term might only serve to exacerbate Michelle’s emotional and 
psychological problems, making her more likely to commit a crime in the future.  Instead, 
rehabilitation may justify a shortened sentence or diversion to non-incarcerative programs because 
the offender is more likely to improve outside of prison.222  Conviction under a statute for assisting 
or encouraging suicide would result in a shorter prison term than a conviction for manslaughter, 
thus reducing the possibility that incarceration can inflict severe negative psychological effects on 
Michelle and other offenders like her. 
iv. Retribution 
Lastly, the theory of retribution argues that offenders should be punished because “crime 
inherently merits punishment.”223  Punishment for retribution gives offenders what they deserve 
and prevents the punishment of those who do not deserve it.  Retributive punishment does not seek 
to achieve social benefits, but instead seeks to inflict harm on someone who deserves it.224 Thus, 
                                                        
because prosecution for encouraging or assisting suicide is sporadic and inconsistent, there is no data regarding rates 
of recidivism.  
220 See Craig Haney, Demonizing the “Enemy”: The Role of “Science” in Declaring the “War on Prisoners,” 9 
CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 185, 191 (2010) (documenting the failure of rehabilitative programs in American corrections 
because “program-oriented officials typically lacked funding and personnel commensurate to the task at hand”).   
221 See id. at 194 (“Rather than focusing exclusively on the presumed pathology of prisoners to account for post-
prison problems and possible recidivism, [in their book C-Unit: Search for Community in Prison, Studt, Messinger, 
and Wilson’s analysis] placed part of the blame on the nature of institutions in which [the prisoners] had been kept.  
It was one sign among many of a growing recognition that powerful and potentially destructive forces at work in 
prison, even within the very programs that were designed to help produce positive change in the name of 
rehabilitation.”) (discussing ELLIOT STUDT, ET AL., C-UNIT: SEARCH FOR COMMUNITY IN PRISON 3 (1968)). 
222 See Michele Cotton, Back with a Vengeance: The Resilience of Retribution as an Articulated Purpose of 
Criminal Punishment, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1313, 1317 (2000).   
223 See id. at 1315.  Retribution in this sense is also called “social retribution,” as opposed to “individual-oriented 
vengeance” which refers to the satisfaction that individuals feel when a criminal is punished.  See Paul Boudreaux, 
Criminal Law: Booth v. Maryland and the Individual Vengeance Rationale for Criminal Punishment, 80 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 177, 184 (1989). 
224 See Cotton, supra note 223, at 1315–16. 
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retributive theory calls for punishment even when no social benefit will result, a fact that sets it 
apart from the other utilitarian theories of punishment.225   Though sometimes considered the 
original purpose of punishment,226  recent scholarship has recast retributivism as a method of 
limiting punishment, giving offenders only as much punishment as they deserve.227  This gives rise 
to the difficulty with assigning desert: how does retributivist theory decide who deserves to be 
punished and how much punishment the offender deserves? 228   Under one theory, protective 
retributivism, punishment would look to the harms society suffered as a result of the offender’s 
action. 229   Under another theory, victim vindication, the degree of punishment the offender 
deserves is that which would “even the score” between the offender and the victim of his or her 
crime.230  
Encouraging suicide is considered a threat to the “interests in the sanctity of life that are 
represented by the criminal homicide laws . . . even though the act may be accomplished with the 
consent, or at the request, of the suicide victim.”231  In Michelle’s case, many people might find 
what Michelle did morally repugnant—something even her lawyer, Joseph Cataldo, 
acknowledges.232  Some have called her actions “horrendous,” and others have commented that 
                                                        
225 See id. at 1316. 
226 See Meghan J. Ryan, Proximate Retribution, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 1049, 1053–54 (2012) [hereinafter Proximate 
Retribution] (tracing retributivism back to the Hammurabi Code of about 1760 BC and the Bible). 
227 See, e.g., Alice Ristroph, Desert, Democracy, and Sentencing Reform, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1293, 
1302 (2006) (internal quotations omitted) (criticizing the modern view that “desert is a limiting principle, a principle 
that, though it would rarely tell us the exact sanction to be imposed . . . would nevertheless give us the outer limits of 
leniency and severity which should not be exceeded.”); see also Proximate Retribution, supra note 226, at 1062 
(“[T]he permutation of . . . modern retributivism that has gained the most traction among courts and scholars is 
‘limiting retributivism,’ which uses the tenets of ordinary retributivism to determine the appropriate endpoints on an 
acceptable range of punishment and uses consequentialist theories to determine the particular punishment within that 
range.”). 
228 See Proximate Retribution, supra note 226, at 1064–69. 
229 See id. at 1066–67. 
230 See id. at 1068–69. 
231 In re Joseph G., 667 P.2d 1176, 1181 (Cal. 1983). 
232 See Susan Zalkind, Is Telling Someone to Commit Suicide a Crime?, VICE, Sept. 2, 2015, 
http://www.vice.com/read/is-telling-someone-to-commit-suicide-a-crime-902?utm_source=vicetwitteurs (“Cataldo 
maintains Carter was simply exercising her freedom of speech and that her words do not add up to a manslaughter 
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“there should be some way that society punishes this behavior.”233  Similarly, the Michigan Court 
of Appeals called encouraging suicide “morally reprehensible” but ultimately not a crime, because 
there was no statute in Michigan prohibiting it.234  Punishing encouragement of suicide under a 
specific statute would punish the offender, serving society’s need for retribution.  At the same 
time, it would also serve the limiting principle of modern retributivism, by allowing for a shorter 
sentence.  A shorter sentence is more proportionate to the crime of the person who encouraged a 
suicide.  Under the protectionist view of retribution, offenders should be punished in proportion to 
their crime.  Michelle’s actions, while reprehensible, do not rise to the level of culpability of an 
accidental shooting235 or providing a gun to someone intent on committing suicide.236  Choosing 
between manslaughter and a specific statute, the victim vindication theory of retributivism would 
also require the less severe of the two.  The evidence that the “victims” of encouraged suicide often 
manipulate their loved ones into helping them tends to show that there is much less of a score to 
“even” in the case of this specific crime.237   
VI. Conclusion 
When the news spread that Bristol County Massachusetts was charging Michelle Carter 
with manslaughter for encouraging her boyfriend to commit suicide, some questioned whether her 
actions actually constituted manslaughter.238  Her actions did not fit the public’s preconceived 
notion of what manslaughter is.  Her case seemed to be an anomaly, prompting widespread media 
attention.  However, a close look at both at English common law and cases in various states proves 
                                                        
charge.  Her messages may be disturbing, but they are not criminal, he says.  ‘If you find it repugnant that's fine,’ 
says Cataldo.”). 
233 See Slifer, supra note 5. 
234 See People v. Campbell, 335 N.W.2d 27, 31 (Mich. App. 1983). 
235 See e.g., Commonwealth v. Mink, 123 Mass. 422, 427 (1877); Commonwealth v. McCauley, 246 N.E.2d 425, 
426 (Mass. 1969); Commonwealth v. Power-Koch, 871 N.E.2d 1085, 1087 (Mass. App. 2007). 
236 Persampieri v. Commonwealth, 175 N.E.2d 387, 389 (Mass. 1961). 
237 See supra footnote 211 and accompanying text. 
238 See Zalkind, supra note 232. 
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that her case is not the first of its kind.  Because Massachusetts law allows prosecutors to treat any 
and all encouragement or assistance of suicide under a theory of manslaughter, there have been 
inconsistent outcomes that do little to advance the goals of punishment.  As the above analysis 
indicates, a specific statute that prohibits encouragement and assistance of suicide will better serve 
the goals of punishment and is preferable to the current approach.  A statutory solution will allow 
the legislature within each state to clarify this area of law; otherwise, prosecutors will continue to 
make due with an unclear legal landscape and an antiquated punishment for an act that has become 
more nuanced due to modern technology.  
 
 
